Mr. Magoo goes to the World Bank

Mr. Magoo goes to the World Bank

http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2005/03/17/wolfowitz_nomination/index_np.html


The problem with Paul Wolfowitz isn't that he's an evil genius. It's that he has been consistently, astonishingly, unswervingly wrong about foreign policy for 30 years.

March 17, 2005 | The nomination of Paul Wolfowitz to be president of the World Bank, following his commission of a long and costly series of blunders as deputy secretary of defense in George W. Bush's first term, comes as no surprise to those familiar with his career. Wolfowitz is the Mr. Magoo of American foreign policy. Like the myopic cartoon character, Wolfowitz stumbles onward blindly and serenely, leaving wreckage and confusion behind.

Critics are wrong to portray Wolfowitz as a malevolent genius. In fact, he's friendly, soft-spoken, well meaning and thoughtful. He would be the model of a scholar and a statesman but for one fact: He is completely inept. His three-decade career in U.S. foreign policy can be summed up by the term that President Bush coined to describe the war in Iraq that Wolfowitz promoted and helped to oversee: a "catastrophic success."

Even the greatest statesman makes some mistakes. But Wolfowitz is perfectly incompetent. He is the Mozart of ineptitude, the Einstein of incapacity. To be sure, he has his virtues, the foremost of which is consistency. He has been consistently wrong about foreign policy for 30 years.

In the 1970s and 1980s, as a member of the Committee on the Present Danger and "Team B," Wolfowitz and his allies, such as Richard Perle, argued that the decrepit Soviet Union was vastly more powerful than the CIA claimed it was. After the Soviet Union dissolved, it turned out that the CIA had exaggerated Soviet strength.

More than anyone else, Wolfowitz is associated with the neoconservative fantasy of a planetary Pax Americana. This strategy, originally called "reassurance," first surfaced in leaked Pentagon planning documents in 1992, in which Wolfowitz, working for then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, had a hand. The rest of the world reacted with outrage to the implication that Europe and Asia should remain permanent American protectorates. Embarrassed, the first president Bush and Secretary of State James Baker hastily disavowed this strategy.

Unfortunately, no bad idea ever dies. Wolfowitz spent the Clinton years, while he was the dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Strategic Studies, at the center of a network of neoconservative policy intellectuals, political appointees and mouthpieces like William Kristol and Charles Krauthammer devoted to maintaining U.S. hegemony in a "unipolar world." The influence of Wolfowitz and his fellow neoconservatives is clear in President Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy, which calls for the United States to dissuade "potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in the hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." Note the language. Not "surpassing, or equaling, the power" of a coalition of states, like the alliances in which America took part in the world wars and the Cold War. No, the United States had to adopt as its motto the explanation of the single Texas Ranger dispatched to quell a mob: "One riot, one Ranger."

Inadvertently proving that talent always skips a generation, Wolfowitz and his neoconservative allies persuaded Bush to pursue two policies his wiser father had rejected as imprudent: a bid for unilateral world domination and going all the way to Baghdad. By adopting the unilateral hegemony strategy that Wolfowitz favored, the younger Bush alienated most of America's traditional allies and gave credibility to anti-Americans everywhere. By going to Baghdad, as Wolfowitz wanted, the younger Bush exposed the limits of U.S. military power to America's enemies and the world as a whole. That not inconsiderable asset, t